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NOTES
THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Third-party practice,' embodied in Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,2 represents an attempt to curtail multiplicity of actions by providing:
.... A defendant may move .... for leave as a third-party plaintiff to serve a
summons and complaint upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be
liable to him or to the plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him. If
called the third-party dethe motion is granted, .... the person so serv ed ....
fendant, shall make his defenses as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims and
cross-claims against the plaintiff as provided in Rule 13. The third-party defendant
may assert any defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's claim.
The third-party defendant is bound by the adjudication of the third-party plaintiff's
I For more general discussions of third-party practice see Cohen, Impleader: Enforcement
of the Defendants' Rights against Third Parties, 33 Col. L. Rev. z147 (1933); Bennett, Bring-

ing in Third Parties by the Defendant, ig Minn. L. Rev. x63 (1935); Poteat, Third Party
Practice under the New Rules, 25 A.B.A.J. 858 (1939); Third-Party Practice, 70 Sol. J. 4o6
(1926).
28 U.S.C.A. following § 723

(c) (Supp.

1939).
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liability to the plaintiff ..... The plaintiff may amend his pleadings to assert against
the third-party defendant any claim which the plaintiff might have asserted against
the third-party defendant had he been joined originally as a defendant .....
When a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff, he may cause a third party to
be brought in under circumstances which under this rule would entitle a defendant
to do so.
Although third-party practice has been used in English courts as early as
18733 and in American admiralty since 1883,4 only a few American jurisdictions
have adopted this device. s This practice is new to the federal courts except in
those jurisdictions in which it was applied pursuant to the Conformity Act.6
While the problems raised by Rule 14 are varied, most of them involve the
question whether there is one suit with three parties or two suits: one between
the plaintiff and the defendant, the other between the third-party plaintiff
and the third-party defendant. Subsequent discussion will elaborate this point.
Among the problems raised by Rule i4 are:
i.What constitutes the plaintiff's claim for which the third-party defendant
must be liable under the terms of Rule 14? Third-party practice has been restricted in some states, notably New York and Pennsylvania, by narrow inter'7
pretations of such phrases as "claim" and "cause of action."
2. Is an independent ground of jurisdiction a prerequisite to bringing in a
third party? Thus, assume that A, a citizen of Illinois, sues B, a citizen of
Indiana. May B bring in C, also a citizen of Indiana (or of Illinois)? There is.
3Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, § 24 (3; Supreme Court of
Judicature Act, 1925, 15 & i6 Geo. V, c. 49, § 39 (i925). For the modern procedure, see
Annual Practice, Order i6A, Rules 1-13 (i939). The history of the English practice is traced
in Cohen, op. cit. supra note i, at 1169.
4In The Hudson, 15 Fed. 162 (D.C. N.Y. 1883), the defendant was allowed to bring in a
ship which it alleged was jointly responsible with it for the claim sued upon. The practice won
almost immediately acceptance and was incorporated into admiralty as Rule 59 (1883). Cf.
the present more liberal admiralty Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A. following § 723 (1928).
s Ark. Civ. Cpde (Crawford, i937) § io8; La. Civ. Code Ann. (Dart, 1932) art. 378-88;
N.Y. Civil Practice Act § 193, (2)-(4); Pa. Rules of Civ. Proc. Nos. 2251-8, 332 Pa. cxxiii
(1938), superseding the Sci. Fa. Act (Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 12, § 141); Wis. Stat.
(i937) §§ 26o-Ig, 260.2o. The practice has been developed in Texas through judicial decision,
Lottman v. Cuilla, 288 S.W. 123 (Tex. Com'n of App. 1926).
It seems that § 25 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. c. iio, § 149 (1939))
was not intended to provide for third-party practice, but Rules 28-44 of the Municipal Court
of Chicago do provide for such procedure. Doubt has been expressed as to their validity since
there was no statutory authorization for them. See Gregory, Third Party Practice under the
Illinois Practice Act and the Chicago Municipal Court Rules, i Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 536,
541 (1934). In Inner Group Financing Corp. v. Halsted Exchange Nat'l Bank, 287 Ill
App. 352, 4 N.E. (2d) 905, and in Jones v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 282 Ill.
App. 131
(1935), however, judgments were rendered in accordance with the Municipal Court rules
without their validity being mentioned.
6
Rev. Stat. § 914 (1875), 28 U.S.C.A. § 724 (1928).
See notes io and 25 infra.
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diversity of citizenship, a constitutional ground for jurisdiction, 8 between A
and B, but there is no diversity between B and C (or between A and C).
3. May a third party insist upon the fulfilment of the venue requirement of
an original action against him?
4. Ought process directed to third-party defendants be extended to run
throughout the United States so that third-party actions, like interpleader
suits,9 will not be restricted by the present limits on federal process?
I. WHAT CONSTITUTES THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM

Since Rule i4 provides that the defendant may move for leave to bring
into the action one liable "to him or to the plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim"' against him," the meaning which the courts give to the words
"the plaintiff's claim against him [the defendant]" will have an important effect
on the availability of the rule. It may be argued that a defendant will not be
able to bring into the action one who he alleges is solely liable to the plaintiff
for the reason that in such case the third-party defendant is liable not for "the
plaintiff's claim against the defendant," but for a separate claim of the plaintiff's. Thus, a defendant sued for injuries caused by his negligence while driving
might not be allowed to bring in the driver of another automobile involved in
the accident, if he alleged that the other was solely liable. Further, it is doubtful whether a person alleged to be liable for only a part of the plaintiff's claim
may be brought in when his liability rests on a different tort or separate contract from that on which the liability of the original defendant rests." The
suggested inapplicability of third-party practice to most cases where the third
party is alleged to be directly liable, particularly if he is alleged to be solely
liable, is further emphasized when it is realized that in few situations of this
type is the defendant aided in presenting his defense by bringing in a party
who, he alleges, is directly liable to the plaintiff.
One case, however, which appears to be clearly within the terms of the rule
is that where a defendant sued in tort seeks to bring in a joint tortfeasor alleging
his joint and several liability. Here there seems to be a closer identity of claim.
8U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2 (1).
9 49 Stat. io96 (1936), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (26) (Supp. 1939).
so In Pennsylvania the third-party defendant must be liable for the "cause of action declared upon," Pa. Rules of Civ. Proc. No. 252, 332 Pa. cxxii ('939); in New York, for the
"claim made against such party," N.Y. Civil Practice Act § z93 (2). Third-party practice
in these jurisdictions has been much restricted by narrow interpretations of such phrases. In
Jones v. Wohigemuth, 313 Pa. 388, 169 Atl. 738 (1934), the court held that a third party liable
over in assumpsit could not be brought in when the plaintiff's claim was in tort. Cf. Nichols v.
Clark, Mac Mullen & Riley, Inc., 261 N.Y. rI8, 184 N.E. 729 (1933), discussed p. 364 infra.
For the English development, see Cohen op. cit. supra note x, at 1171-76.
"sThe few cases in point have allowed a defendent to bring in a party alleged to be solely
liable, Bossard v. McGwinn, 27 F. Supp. 412 (Pa. 1939); Crum v. Appalachian Electric Power
Co., 27 F. Supp. 138 (W. Va. 1939); Satink v. Holland Tp., 28 F. Supp. 67 (N.J. i939);

Kravas v. Great Atlantic &Pacific Tea Co.,

28

F. Supp. 66 (Pa. 1939).
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In those states where contribution among joint tortfeasors is not permitted,
the third-party defendant may object that if he is brought in, the rule against
contribution will be altered. In answer to this argument it should be pointed
out that the defendant, by alleging direct liability is not seeking contribution
strictly; he is merely seeking to encourage the plaintiff to recover a portion of
the loss from the third party. It is submitted that to the rule against contribution, which has been severely criticized,12 the courts should not add a rule
prohibiting a defendant from attempting to obtain some apportioning of the
liability.
Another objection to bringing in tortfeasors jointly and severally liable is
advanced by Moore. He suggests that "strictly C. D. [the original defendant]
cannot show that E. F. [the third-party defendant] is liable for plaintiff's
several, not joint claim against C. D. It is true that E. F. is liable to the same
extent as C. D., but that is because of a claim which plaintiff has, and which
he does not assert against E. F." 3 But if Moore's objection is valid, it seems
to follow that when, under similar circumstances, two defendants are sued,
they can bring in one jointly and severally liable with them, on the theory that
a joint claim is asserted.
Perhaps the third-party situation most clearly covered by the rule is that
where a defendant sued in tort seeks to bring in his insurer in a state where, by
statute, an injured party may sue the insurance company directly,'4 for here
the insurer is liable "to the plaintiff .... for .... the plaintiff's claim against
him [defendant]." It may have been to provide for just this situation that the
italicized words were inserted, for without them Rule 14 would permit impleader only in cases where the third party is alleged to be "liable over" to the
defendant. Or perhaps the simple explanation for the inclusion of these words
is that they were copied, without serious question as to applicability, from Admiralty Rule 56. That rule provides: "..... the respondent .... shall be entitled
to bring in any .... person .... who may be .... liable either to the libellant
or to such .... respondent ..... "is
It seems, however, more in keeping with the spirit of the rules to hold that
the third-party defendant is liable for the plaintiff's claim if the defendant might
reduce his liability by proving his allegations against the third-party defendant.
12See Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions, z (1936); Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity between Tortfeasors, 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 13o, 131 (1932); Uniform
Contribution among Tortfeasors Act (§ 7 of the act, providing for third-party practice,
follows the phraseology of Federal Rule 14.)

"z
3
Moore, Federal Practice 742 (1938).
'4 See Richards, Law of Insurance §§ 504-6 (4 th ed.

1932).

This view is advanced by Charles 0. Gregory, Associate Professor of Law, University
of Chicago Law School. The suggestion that the phrase "to the plaintiff" should be included
in Rule 14 first appears in a letter by Fitz-Henry Smith, Jr. to Edgar B. Tolman dated August
6, 1936. In support of his suggestion Smith cites the similar phraseology of Admiralty Rule 56.
The words were incorporated in the April, 1937, draft.
IS
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Since, however, the right to bring in a third party is not absolute upon qualifying
under the terms of the rule, 6 the court should also consider whether a defendant
will be aided in presenting his defense or relieved of possible hardship by bringing in a party alleged to be directly liable. Normally, a defendant will be able
to present his defenses equally well without the presence of a party who he
alleges is liable for the claim sued upon. Assuming, however, that the thirdparty defendant is added, if the plaintiff does not amend, the third party should
move to be dismissed from the action, for no one is claiming relief from him. If,
despite plaintiff's failure to amend, the third party is not dismissed, and is found
by a special verdict to be solely liable for the plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff
should not be able to recover a judgment against him since the third party
would have had no reason to present his defenses. The plaintiff, however, may
7
be estopped by the verdict from suing him in a separate action.
A recent case, Crim v. Lumberman's Insurance Co.,' indicates a different
approach to the question of what constitutes the plaintiff's claim. An automobile
liability insurance company was sued on an oral contract of settlement after the
Statute of Limitations had run on the claim against the insured. It alleged that it
was not liable for the plaintiff's claim since it had made no oral contract, but
that the plaintiff's lawyer was solely liable to him for failing to bring suit against
the insured within the statutory period. In allowing the third party to be introduced the court adopted a joinder test-whether the plaintiff could have joined
the third-party defendant and the defendant originally, according to the rules
for joinder.19 The court apparently relied on the clause in Rule 14 which allows
the plaintiff to amend in order to assert against the third-party defendant any
claims he might have asserted originally. It is submitted that this sentence was
intended to confer a privilege on the plaintiff and was not intended as a test by
which to determine whether a third party could be brought in. It is difficult to
see how any question to be litigated in the main action could involve the attorney. Even assuming that from the accident only one claim accrued to the
plaintiff which he may assert against the lawyer, the insured, and the insurer,
still the attorney's presence will not aid the insurer in freeing itself from liability. The result in this case illustrates the advisability of requiring the defendant to show that the presence of the third party will assist him in freeing
himself from liability. It is important that third-party practice, a valuable procedural device, be not permitted to degenerate into just another tool employed
by defendants to delay and complicate the action20
16 Federal Rule 14 gives a conditional right only: ....
the defendant may move for leave
to bring into the action.......
17 Cf. compulsory counterclaims under Rule 13(a).
Z826 F. Supp. 7z5 (D.C. 1939).
'9 Federal Rules x9 and 20.
20 This seems to have occurred to some extent in Pennsylvania. See The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court Rules Regulating Joinder of Additional Defendants by Scire Facias, x3 Temple
L.Q. 506, 1ir (1938).
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When liability over is sought, the problem of identity of claim appears in a
different light. Here in one sense there can never be an absolute identity of
claim between the plaintiff and the third-party plaintiff since the latter must
always allege and prove at least one additional fact in addition to those alleged
by the plaintiff, viz., the ground on which the third party is liable over. From
this fact and from the words of the rule, "liable to him [the defendant] .... for
the plaintiff's claim ... ." it may be argued that in this situation no identity of
claim was deemed necessary. The apparent ease of application of the rule is illusory when the widely varying types of cases in which liability over may be
sought is considered. Thus, where a close similarity of claims exists as, for
instance, when an insurer is brought in on a liability policy, the case seems to be
within the ambit of the rule, for the insurance company has contracted to
indemnify the defendant for precisely the event alleged to have happened.21
But, when the claims are less related the applicability of the rule is not so clear.
Because of unrelated character of the issues the court may invoke its discretion
in denying the right to bring in the third party. Thus, in a recent case, 2 defendant, sued on a negligence theory for injuries caused by a stone in nuts covering an ice-cream bar, moved to bring in the firm from which it had purchased
the nuts used in the manufacture of the bars, alleging that it was liable over on
an implied warranty of fitness. It should be noticed that the issue in the first
case is whether at some point in the manufacture a stone was allowed to get
into the nuts, while the issue in the supplementary suit is whether stones were
in the nuts when purchased. Although a motion to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim on which relief could be
granted was dismissed, still if the motion had been based on the dissimilarity of
issues, the court might have dismissed the third-party complaint or ordered a
separate trial under Rule 42(b). Or suppose that the defendant sought to recover for breach of warranty not only on the nuts sold to the plaintiff, but also
on other quantities purchased at the same time. The third-party defendant may
argue that the plaintiff's claim for which the third-party defendant must be
liable by the terms of Rule r4 is for, and can only be for, nuts which the plaintiff
has purchased, so that recovery for warranties on any other purchase of nuts
is improper.
Again, the plaintiff's claim may be predicated on two theories although the
third-party defendant will be liable only if a certain one is proved. Thus, in a
New York case,23 an engineering firm was sued for negligently recommending a
defective insulating material and for its negligent installation. The court held
"But courts are loath to allow insurance companies to be impleaded because of the known
2
prejudice of jurors against them, Jacobs v. Pellegrino, 154 Misc. 651, 277 N.Y. Supp. 654
(1935); Gowar v. Hales, [1928] 1 K.B. 19i (C.A.).
22Saunders v. Goldstein, 3 o F. Supp. 15o (D.D.C. 1939); cf. William v. Flagg Storage Warehouse Co., 128 Misc. 566, 22o N.Y. Supp. 124 (1927), aff'd 221 App. Div. 788, 223 N.Y. Supp.
925 (,927).
23

Nichols v. Clark, MacMiullen & Riley, Inc., 261 N.Y. II8, 184 N.E.

729

(1933).
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that the defendant could not bring in the manufacturer of the insulation since
the "causes of action" were not the same: judgment might be entered for the
plaintiff because of the defendant's negligent work, a basis of recovery for
which the third-party defendant would not be liable over. Since, as shown
above, there can never be strict identity of claim where liability over is asserted,
it is submitted that whether a third party "liable over" may be brought in
under the terms of Rule 14 should be decided by ascertaining whether there is
a similarity of facts and issues to be decided4 between the plaintiff and the
defendant on the one hand and the defendant and third-party defendant on the
other.2s Even though the terms of the rule are satisfied, however, the court still
should not allow a third party to be brought in if by so doing the action will
become unnecessarily complex or if the plaintiff will be unduly delayed.
II.

JURISDICTION
26

The early case of Strawbridge v. Curliss established the principle, often

qualified but never overruled, that where federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship,'7 there must be diversity between all the plaintiffs and all
the defendants.28 This rule becomes important when it is impossible to show
diversity between the third party and one or both of the original parties. Rule
14 contains no express requirement of independent federal jurisdiction, nor
does Official Form 2229 require its allegation. In view of the express provisions
of Rule 13 (h) on counterclaims and cross-claims, permitting the addition of new
parties only on condition of the court's securing jurisdiction over them, it can
be argued that independent jurisdictional grounds were deemed unnecessary
24The

third-party defendant must be liable over to the party who seeks to bring him in.

It is not sufficient that he be liable over to another defendant, Tullgren v. Jasper, 27 F. Supp.
413 (Md. 1939).

2SThe Pennsylvania Scire Facias Act as amended in 1937 (Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon,

1938),

§ 141) allowed a third-party defendant to be brought in provided he was liable "for the cause
of action declared upon or because any question or issue, relating to .... the subject matter
of the litigation is substantially the same as a question or issue arising between the plaintiff
and the defendant ..... " But the new Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Proc. No. 2252, 332
Pa. cxxiii (1939) omits the "question or issue" phrase. The 1937 amendment was copied from
the English rule, Annual Practice Order x6A, Rule z(c) (1939).
26 3 Cranch (U.S.) 267 (i8o8).
27 This article is confined to diversity problems, but questions similar to those here discussed arise when jurisdiction over the original defendant rests on some other ground enumerated in Article 3 , Section 2 (i) of the Constitution, while the nature of the third party's liability is such that he could not have been sued in the federal courts. See, for example, Willing
v. Pennsylvania Co., 16 F. Supp. 953 (Pa. 2936).
280n the scope of federal jurisdiction generally, see Schulman and Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Procedure, 45 Yale L.J. 393 (1936). The historic background
of diversity jurisdiction is traced by Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction,
41 Harv. L. Rev. 483 (1928). See also Third Party Practice and Diversity Jurisdiction: A
Conflict, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 449 (294o).
29Form 22 is to be used for motions to bring in third-party defendants.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

in third-party practice. An analysis of the two situations corroborates this
argument. Under Rule 14 the third-party defendant must be liable for the
plaintiff's claim. Hence, it may be said, only one claim is involved and any
issues litigated with the third-party defendant are merely ancillary to the main
suit. But a counterclaim is a different claim from the plaintiff's and, hence, so
far as third parties are concerned, independent jurisdictional grounds are
necessary. None of the members of the Advisory Committee who have expressed themselves have made this distinction, however. In fact, several have
stated that independent jurisdictional grounds would be required in actions
under Rule 14.30
Litigants may suggest that in finding jurisdiction, cases where the third-party
plaintiff alleges that the third-party defendant is directly liable to the plaintiff
should be distinguished from those in which reimbursement is sought, on the
theory that in the former instance there is but one action, while in the latter
there are two: the original suit between the plaintiff and the defendant, and an
ancillary one between the defendant and the third-party defendant. Hence, one
may say, the test of jurisdiction when direct liability is alleged should be
whether the plaintiff, A, might have joined the third-party defendant, C, as a
co-defendant,31 while if the claim is for reimbursement the test should be
whether there is diversity (or other federal basis for jurisdiction) between the
third-party plaintiff, B, and C.32 It follows that if B claims C is directly liable
with him, C cannot be brought in when he is a citizen of the plaintiff's state
30 Mr.Mitchell was of the opinion that when liability over was alleged, a defendant could
not bring in a citizen of his own state, Amer. Bar Ass'n, Institute on Federal Rules, Washington, D.C., 1938, at 34o (1939). See also Dean (now Judge) Clark's remarks, ibid., at 6o.
Note the following remarks of Major Tolman:
"Mr. Chandler. Suppose a party whom the defendant attempts to bring into court happens
to be a resident of the same state in which the plaintiff resides, what about the question of
diversity?
Mr. Tolman. He cannot be brought in .....
Mr. Robinson. He cannot be brought in unless he could have been originally sued?
Mr. Tolman. That is it .... ," H. R. Hearings on the Rules of Civil Procedure and on
H. R. 8892, 75th Cong. 3d Sess., at io5 (1938).
31 This was the test in Osthaus v. Button, 7o F. (2d) 392 (C.C.A.
3 d 1934), where defendant who alleged that the third-party defendant was directly liable was not allowed to
bring in a co-citizen of the plaintiff. But see Fisher v. Yellow Cab Co., i6 Pa. Dist. & Co. 251
(U.S. D.C. Pa. 1931) and Willing v. Pennsylvania Co., i6 F. (2d) 953 (D.C. Pa. 1936). The
Osthaus case throws considerable doubt on the recent district court decisions sustaining jurisdiction in similar cases (see cases cited note 48 infra).
32 In Sperry v. Keeler Transportation Co., 28 F. (2d) 897 (D.C. N.Y. 1928), and in Wilson
v. United American Lines, Inc., 21 F. (2d)872 (D.C. N.Y. r927), a defendant was not allowed
to bring in a citizen of his own state where liability over was alleged. Franklin v. Meredith Co.,
64 F. (2d) io9 (C.C.A. 2d 1927), and Lowery v. Nat'l City Bank of New York, 28 F. (2d) 895
(D.C. N.Y. 1928), where third parties were allowed to be brought in to obtain reimbursement,
are distinguishable on the ground that in the latter cases the co-citizenship existed between
the plaintiff and the third-party defendant.
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since A would have been unable to join him under the rule of Strawbridge v.
Curtliss. Furthermore, it is difficult to say that the court has an ancillary jurisdiction over C. Such an argument may be made when liability over is sought
on the theory that there are two actions, one ancillary to the other, but when
direct liability is alleged there can be said to be but one action and that cannot
be ancillary to itself. jurisdiction may be sustained, however, by analogy to
those cases holding that after jurisdiction has attached, it is unaffected by the
intervention of a third person as a party defendant.33 But the rationale for refusing to allow a third-party defendant to be brought in in this case is that the
plaintiff should not be allowed to achieve indirectly what he cannot achieve
directly. Furthermore, as suggested in Part I of this note, the presence of the
third party will frequently be unnecessary to dispose of the claim asserted
against the original defendant.
When liability over is alleged, the need for establishing independent jurisdiction over the third-party defendant seems obviated by the ancillary character
of the controversy between the third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant. This ancillary character is implicit in the rule. It permits the thirdparty defendant to assert defenses to the plaintiff's claim, makes the establishment of the defendant's liability to the plaintiff a condition precedent to a finding of the third-party defendant's liability, and binds the third-party defendant
by the adjudication in the main action. In fact, so intimate is the connection
of the third-party defendant to the original controversy and so significant is his
part in the main suit that there may be said to be but one action with one
plaintiff and two defendants as to whom there is complete diversity, and of this
type of action the court admittedly has jurisdiction. Under this view there
should be no objection to litigating the issues between the co-citizen defendants, in view of the strong analogy to the old equity practice permitting crossbills between co-citizens provided they were related to the main action.34 The
objection to this theory is that it would apparently necessitate a showing of
diversity between the plaintiff and each defendant, a requirement which would
defeat jurisdiction if the third-party defendant were a citizen of the plaintiff's
state. A court anxious to extend its jurisdiction in order to avoid hardship
would probably overlook the latter difficulty simply by denominating ancillary
the controversy with the third-party defendant.
When liability over is asserted, the claim against the third-party defendant
may also be called ancillary on the ground that his presence is necessary to dispose completely of the main controversy which is already properly in the federal
court. In Moore v. New York Cotton .Exchange3S the court granted the de3"See cases cited note 36 infra.
34 Rickey Land & Cattle Co. v. Miller & Lux, 218 U.S. 258 (igio); American Realty Co. v.
Big Indian Mining Co., 146 Fed. i66 (C.C. Mont. 19o6); Morgan's L. &T. R. & Steamship Co.
v. Texas Central R. Co., 137 U.S. 171, i89 (I89o) (jurisdiction sustained on a cross-bill between
co-citizens where there was property before the court).
3S 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
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fendant injunctive relief on a non-federal counterclaim, even though it dismissed the plaintiff's bill which alleged, with substantial cause, a violation of the
anti-trust laws. If the basis of the decision is the broad ground that after
jurisdiction attached the court could grant all relief necessary to dispose of the
action, then it is arguable that a third party allegedly liable over may be
brought in to grant the defendant complete relief, just as the defendant in the
Moore case was granted complete relief on his counterclaim. Of course, it should
be recognized that the relief given in the Moore case did not extend beyond the
parties to the original suit, and for this reason the case probably does not
authorize adding new parties without an independent jurisdictional basis. In
one sense, however, the third-party case is even stronger for granting the defendant relief since the plaintiff's claim has not, by hypothesis, been dismissed.
The clue to deciding the problem of whether independent jurisdictional
grounds are necessary when liability over is alleged may appear from intervention cases which seem to hold that where a party has an absolute right to intervene no independent jurisdictional basis need be shown between the intervenor
and the party with whom he has an adverse interest.s 6 While these cases apparently indicate that complete diversity is not a constitutional requirement,
it should be pointed out that in the cjassic instances in which the right is absolute, namely, when the intervenor claims an interest in the property before
the court and when the intervenor is inadequately represented in an action
binding on him,37 ancillary jurisdiction over the intervenor may be supported
on the ground that the processes of the court should not be used to perpetrate
injustice on an absent party. While in actions brought under Rule 14 there is
no question of hardship to an absent party, the third-party plaintiff may, in
some cases, be severely prejudiced if the liability of his indemnitor must be
decided in a separate action since the first judgment may not be binding upon
the third party. Hence, if possible hardship is an important factor in calling
an action ancillary, then the results reached in the absolute right of intervention cases afford a persuasive analogy. If, however, the third-party plaintiff
is merely convenienced by bringing in the third-party defendant, then those
cases requiring independent jurisdictional grounds where the right to intervene is conditional only38 seem most suggestive. For generally in such instances
the would-be intervenor loses nothing if intervention is denied. Furthermore,
36 Krippendorf v. Hyde, io U.S. 276 (1884); Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236 (i886). But cf.
Drumright v. Texas Sugarland Co., i6 F. (2d) 657 (C.C.A. 5th 1927). For a full discussion,
see Moore and Levi, Federal Intervention: II. The Procedure, Status, and Federal Jurisdictional Requirements, 47 Yale L. J. 898, 926 (x938).
37 See Moore and Levi, Federal Intervention I. The Right to Intervene and Reorganization, 45 Yale L.J. 565, 58I (1936). Federal Rule 24(a) gives an absolute right under the same
circumstances.
38Fulton Nat'l Bank of Atlanta v. Hozier Intervener, and Smith, 267 U.S. 276 (1925);
Asher v. Bone, ioo F. (2d) 35 (C.C.A. 9th 1938). But cf. Wichita R. Co. v. Public Utility
Com'n, 260 U.S. 48 (1922).
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if independent jurisdictional grounds are held unnecessary in actions under
Rule 14, the third party may often argue that he is being forced into an action
into which he could not have intervened, for his joinder would have been held
to oust the court of its jurisdiction.
Interpleader9 furnishes perhaps the strongest argument for holding that
independent jurisdictional grounds over a third-party defendant are unnecessary. There is authority holding that a stake-holder may, by a strict bill of
interpleader,40 join co-citizen claimants,4' and that by a bill in the nature of a
bill of interpleader he may join a citizen of his own state and litigate issues with
him!' If jurisdiction over a co-citizen claimant be sustained in order to prevent
the stake-holder from being held twice liable, then, in actions under Rule i4,
when liability over is asserted, a like argument may be made. Although the
defendant does not risk double liability, still if the one liable over to him must
be sued in a separate action, the question of the original defendant's liability to
the original plaintiff frequently will not be res judicata as to the third party.
This argument will not apply, however, where direct liability of the third-party
defendant to the original plaintiff is alleged.
But deciding jurisdictional questions by considering whether direct liability
or liability over is alleged will cause difficulties. Thus, in Kravas v. Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.,43 the plaintiff, a citizen of Pennsylvania, sued the
tea company, a New Jersey corporation, for injuries caused by the defective
condition of premises leased by it. The defendant was allowed to bring in its
landlord, also a citizen of Pennsylvania, alleging first, that the lessor was in
control of that portion of the premises which caused the harm, and second,
that if the court found that the defendant was in control, the lessor was liable
over to it by reason of certain covenants in the lease. If jurisdiction over the
lessor had been sustained on the ground that the allegation of liability over
created an independent suit the parties to which were of diverse citizenship,
would the plaintiff be denied recovery if direct liability were proved on the
ground that no diversity could be shown between the plaintiff and the thirdparty defendant? In the Kravas case the court sustained jurisdiction, basing its
39 For examples of statutory interpleader see 49 Stat. xo96 (1936), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (26)
(Supp. x939) and 39 Stat. 541 (x916), 49 U.S.C.A. § 97 (1929) (interpleader by carriers).

40 A strict bill of interpleader differs from a bill in the nature of bills of interpleader in that
in the latter the stake-holder has a ground for equitable relief other than possible double
liability. Thus, he may dispute the extent of his liability to a claimant. See Chafee, The
Federal Interpleader Act of z936, 45 Yale L.J. 963, 970, i6 (1936).
41Mailers v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 87 F. (2d) 233 (C.C.A. 7th 1936), cert. den.
3o U.S. 685 (1937), noted 51 Harv. L. Rev. 168 (x937). On the Interpleader Act of 1936,
49 Stat. io96 (1936), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (26) (Supp. 1939), see in general Chafee, op. cit. supra

note 40.
41Cramer v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 91 F. (2d) 141 (C.C.A. 8th 1937), cert. den. 302

U.S. 739 (1938); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cross, 7 F. Supp. i3o (N.Y. x934).
4328 F. Supp. 66 (Pa. 1939).
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decision on Bossard v. McGwinn44 where the action against the third-party
defendant was held "ancillary." Suppose the third-party defendant had been
a citizen of New Jersey and that direct liability only had been alleged and
jurisdiction sustained on that ground, but that at the trial the evidence showed
that the third-party defendant was merely liable to the defendant. It would be
a waste of the court's time and the litigant's money to refuse to permit the
defendant to amend its pleadings in order to recover. Yet this unfortunate result will be necessary on any theory distinguishing between direct liability and
liability over; otherwise defendants will allege either type of liability which will
confer jurisdiction and then take advantage of the amendment device, if
necessary.
If the above distinctions be disregarded, it may still be argued that the
court has jurisdiction over parties who could not have been joined originally,
or whom the defendant could not have sued in the federal courts in a separate
action. The requirement of complete diversity between plaintiffs and defendants in actions founded on diversity of citizenship is apparently imposed, not
by the Constitution, but rather by the courts through a strict interpretation of
the statute conferring diversity jurisdiction, partly to prevent dockets from
becoming overburdened, partly to prevent the litigation of suits between cocitizens in the federal courts by the addition of nominal parties, and partly to
avoid expanding federal jurisdiction in order to avoid a renewal of the demand
for curtailing the federal judiciary. This explanation is supported by the fact
that while in the analogies discussed above4S (counterclaims, cross-claims, interpleader, and intervention) the courts speak in terms of ancillary jurisdiction, still in each instance the courts do qualify the rule of Strawbridge v.
Curtiss.
As indicated above, analogies are available to sustain federal jurisdiction in
most third-party cases, but as also indicated no one theory sustains jurisdiction
in all cases. Therefore, the maximum effect of Rule 14 can be obtained only by
holding that independent jurisdictional grounds are unnecessary as to third
parties. While this result was not reached in the cases decided under the Conformity Act either where direct liability46 or where liability over 47 was alleged,
F. Supp. 412 (Pa. z939).
45It is usually stated that there must be admiralty jurisdiction over a third party in order
to bring him in under Admiralty Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A. following § 723 (z928), whether direct
liability is alleged (The Goyaz, 281 Fed. 259 (D.C. N.Y. 1922), aff'd 3 F. (2d) 553 (C.C.A. 2d
1924); Rudy Patrick Seed Co. v. Kokusai Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, i F. Supp. 266 (N.Y.
1932); Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. Central Argentine Co., 298 Fed. 344 (D.C. N.Y. 1924)) or
44 27

liability over (Aktieselskabet Fido v. Lloyd Braziliero, 283 Fed. 62 (C.C.A. 2d X922), cert. den.
260 U.S. 737 (1922); Lamborn & Co. v. Compania, Maritimi del Nevrion, 19 F. (2d) 155 (D.C.
N.Y. 1927)). It is doubtful, however, whether the cases actually go beyond requiring independent federal jurisdiction over the new party.
46 See note 32 supra.
47See note 33 supra.
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still it has been adopted by the district courts in cases decided under the new
rules.48

Unless independent jurisdictional requirements are held to be unnecessary,
Rule 14 may become practically a nullity, for the requisite diversity is most
likely to be present when the third-party defendant is a citizen of neither the
defendant's nor the plaintiff's state, yet in these two jurisdictions, where suit
will generally have to be brought, it will be almost impossible to bring in a third
party because of improper venue and inability to serve effective process.
E.

VENUE

In contrast to the jurisdictional difficulties which arise from constitutional
restrictions, venue problems are wholly statutory. Section 51 of the Judicial
Code49 provides that "where jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the
action is between citizens of different States" venue lies in the district of residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant,SO but in other cases in the defendant's district only. A recent federal decisionsr held that in an action based
on diversity of citizenship, a defendant could bring in a co-citizen on the theory
that no independent jurisdictional grounds need be shown as to the third-party
defendant since the action against him is ancillary to the main action. But, the
court added, venue as to the third-party defendant lay in his district only, not
in the plaintiff's district where the suit arose, since as to the third-party defendant the action was not "founded on" diversity of citizenship but on the
court's "ancillary jurisdiction." Hence, the more liberal venue provisions for
diversity actions did not apply.
It is submitted that the court ought not to have considered jurisdiction over
the third-party defendant as "founded on" the court's "ancillary jurisdiction"
as opposed to diversity jurisdiction. The scope of federal jurisdiction is determined by the Constitution s and cannot be added to by the courts. Whatever
right the court may have to adjudicate claims against the third-party defendant is predicated on its jurisdiction over the main action, which rests on
2

48Jurisdiction has been sustained where a co-citizen of the plaintiff was alleged to be
directly liable to the plaintiff, Bossard v. McGwinn, 27 F. Supp. 412 (Pa. 1939); Crum v.
Appalachian Electric Power Co., 27 F. Supp. 138 (W. Va. 1939); Satink v. Holland Tp., 28
F. Supp. 67 (N.J. 1939); Kravas v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea, Co., 28 F. Supp. 66 (Pa.
1939). Likewise a co-citizen of the defendant may be brought in where liability over is sought,
Morrell v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 29 F. Supp. 757 (N.Y. z939); Schram v. Roney,
53 Dept. of Justice Bull. on Fed. Rules 27 (D.C. Mich. 1939); see also Tullgren v. Jasper, 27
F. Supp. 413 (Md. i939); Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Co., 29 F. Supp. 112 (Conn.
1939).
4949 Stat. 1213 (x936), 28 U.S.C.A. § 112 (Supp. 1939).
so On construction of this section of Section 51 of the Judicial Code see 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
397 (1940).
s Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Co., 29 F. Supp. 112 (Conn. 1939).
s2 U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2(I).
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diversity of citizenship; thus, the venue provisions of diversity actions ought to
apply. The third-party defendant is amply protected by the limits on federal
process, which generally speaking does not run beyond state lines. The court
in this case further stated that if it conceded that venue should be determined
according to the basis of jurisdiction of the main action, still since the suit
between the plaintiff and the defendant had been removed from a state court,
jurisdiction was founded on the Removal Statute,s3 and not on diversity of
citizenship. In reply to this reasoning, it should be pointed out that the suit was
"founded on" the removal statute only in the sense that without the statute
there would be no right to remove. The phrase "jurisdiction is founded only
on the fact [of diversity]" as used in Section 51 of the Judicial Code, refers to
diversity as distinguished from the other grounds enumerated in the Constitution. The removal statute is an enabling statute only: it can create no new
ground of jurisdiction. The issue of proper venue ought not to turn on whether
the suit had originated in the federal courts or had been removed from a state
court before the third-party defendant had been brought in.
Since Section 51 of the Judicial Code provides that venue in diversity actions
shall be in the plaintiff's or in the defendant's district, the question arises
whether the plaintiff or the third-party plaintiff will be considered "plaintiff"
for venue purposes. In King v. Shepard,4 where liability over was sought
against a Missouri corporation brought into the action by a citizen of Oklahoma who was being sued in Arkansas by a citizen of that state, the court held
that the third-party defendant could successfully raise the objection of improper venue. The court reasoned that as to the third-party defendant, the
plaintiff was the third-party plaintiff. Hence, venue lay in Oklahoma or in
Missouri, but not in Arkansas. The court considered the case as consisting of
two actions, and hence construed "plaintiff" as used in the statute to mean
"third-party plaintiff." But, since as pointed out above in discussing jurisdictional problems, the third-party defendant may assert defenses to the plaintiff's claim and since he is bound by the adjudication of the defendant's liability to the plaintiff,ss it is somewhat artificial to say that there are two actions;
hence the court could well have decided that the plaintiff as to the third-party
defendant was the original plaintiff. But if the plaintiff is to be so considered
and if, as can hardly be denied, the third-party plaintiff also stands in relation
of plaintiff to the third-party defendant, then the third-party defendant may
argue that venue is bad under the rule requiring co-plaintiffs who reside in different states to sue in the defendant's district of residence only.56 This argument
applies, of course, where the suit is in the third-party plaintiff's district as well.
On the other hand, it may be urged with equal force, at least when direct liability is alleged by the third-party plaintiff, that the action looks as if it consisted
5318

Stat. 470 (1875), 28 U.S.C.A. § 71 (1927).
F. Supp. 357 (Ark. 1938).
S Federal Rule 14.
s6 Smith v. Lyon, 133 U.S. 3,5 (189o).
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of one plaintiff and two defendants and not as if there were two plaintiffs and
one defendant. Hence, it seems that when the suit is in the third-party plaintiff's district, the third-party defendant can object to the venue, for while codefendants who reside in different districts of the same state may be sued in the
district of residence of either,S7 still co-defendants who reside in different states
may not be so joined.s As pointed out above, however, any distinction based
on whether direct liability or liability over is alleged is difficult to sustain in
practice, for third-party plaintiffs will allege both types of liability if by so
doing they can secure venue or jurisdiction. No one theory as to the nature of
these third-party actions will serve to sustain venue in all cases.
Since Rule 82 provides that the new rules shall not be construed to extend
the venue of actions and since it is not the province of the courts to repeal
legislation, the venue requirements for original actions should not be held unnecessary as was done in Morrell v. United Air Lines TransportCo.,59 the facts of
which were similar to those of the King case. In the Morrell case the court held
that since there was no necessity for independent jurisdictional grounds over the
third-party defendant, venue requirements of an independent action need not
be met.
The court's reasoning seems to ignore the different considerations which
underlie the two requirements. Jurisdictional requirements are imposed on
federal courts by general provisions of the Constitution in furtherance of a
policy to maintain a balance between the states and the federal government.
The venue qualifications, however, are specific statutory provisions intended
to protect parties sued against hardship and inconvenience. A court, it would
seem, is sooner justified in expanding the scope of federal jurisdiction to prevent
the working of individual injustice than it is in serving the convenience of one
set of litigants (plaintiffs) at the expense of another set (defendants) when to
do so necessitates controverting an express legislative policy to protect the
latter group.
IV. SERVICE OF PROCESS

Since the process of the federal court does not run beyond state lines6o except
where expressly extended by statute, the effectiveness of Rule 14 will be severely

impaired unless process is made to run throughout the United States, as in
57 Rev.

Stat. § 740 (x875), 28 U.S.C.A. § 113 (1927).
ss Camp v. Gress, 250 U.S. 308 (i919).
19 29

F. Supp. 757 (N.Y. 1939).

6o Federal Rule 4(f). Under the former practice, process did not run beyond the district,
Sewchulis v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 233 Fed-. 422 (C.C.A. 2d 1916); Tauza v. Pennsylvania
R. Co., 232 Fed. 294 (D.C. N.Y. z916). Nor did process run from one division to another of
the same district when the divisions were created by statute, Barfield v. Zenith Tire & Rubber
Co., 9 F. (2d) 204 (D.C. Ohio 1924). Cf. Standish v. Gold Creek Mining Co., 92 F. (2d) 662
(C.C.A. 9 th I937). The above rules were somewhat relaxed by statute. See, for example,
Rev. Stat. § 740 (1875), 28 U.S.C.A. § 113 (1927) (defendants who reside in different districts
of the same state may be sued in the district of residence of either).
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interpleader actions.6x Although the possibility of hardship to the defendant is
not quite as striking as in interpleader suits, nevertheless, the delay between a
judgment for the plaintiff and a judgment against one liable over to a defendant
may prove burdensome. The interests of the third-party defendant could be
protected by a clause requiring the third-party plaintiff to post a bond for the
third-party defendant's costs whenever the latter lived without the state (unless
his residence was within approximately 150 miles of the court). Security for
costs is not new in our law and may in fact be required in petitions for tempo-

6
rary injunctions under Rule 65 (e). 2

The need for extension of process is strikingly illustrated in metropolitan
areas which embrace several states, as, for example, Chicago (Illinois, Michigan
Wisconsin, and Indiana) and New York (New York, Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, Maryland, Connecticut, Delaware, and Massachusetts).
U.S.C.A. § 41 (26) (Supp. 1939).
Cf. Alderman v. Whelen Drug Co., iS Dept. of Justice Bull. on Fed. Rules 28 (D.D.C.
1939) (court may require a non-resident third-party plaintiff to deposit security for costs).
6'49 Stat. io96 (1936), 28
6

2

